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Abstract 
Background: Tax Expenditure Limitations (TELs) are limits placed on either outlays of cash or 
creation of new revenues via tax levy by states. There have been many TEL initiatives since the 
so-called Taxpayer Revolt of the late 1970s. 
Purpose: This paper analyzes the impact of TELs on different types of state expenditures. This 
study provides a comparative analysis of different types of TELs on the state level and aims to 
evaluate the effect of TEL policy on state expenditure structures. 
Methods: Using panel data analysis, this work finds that states with more stringently binding tax 
and expenditure limitations-in addition to other financial and political factors-are associated with 
lower levels of state expenditures on police, parks, natural resources, and highway expenditures. 
Results: Looking at 50 states from 2006 through 2010, the relationship between TELs and the 
selected types of state expenditures described above is both statistically and substantively 
significant. 
Conclusions: TEL initiatives have a defined effect on state budgets and operations. Depending 
on the type of TEL and the type of outlay or levy, the effect can be detrimental to states. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the Project 
1.1 Statement of research problem 
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Faced with the fiscal crisis which began in 2008, state governments have been forced to 
deal with financing necessary public services with limited resources. Taxpayer Expenditure 
Limitations (TELs) are restrictions on governmental units that place a cap on the amount of 
revenue that can be raised through taxation, the amount of spending that a governmental unit can 
engage in, or both (Sun, 2014 ). The goal of such endeavors is to cut state expenditures by 
placing strict limits on the amount of revenue that a state can generate through its taxation 
authority, or by simply limiting expenditures. TELs come in many forms, from municipal 
regulations to state constitutional amendments. Regardless of their form, their ultimate goals are 
the same: the limitation of revenue from taxes on a specified consumer base. The rationale for 
creating this limitation is often to provide relief to a constituency from over-taxation. TELs 
therefore limit the spending power of a governmental unit, or force it to seek revenue in other 
ways. State and local governments have relatively few options available to them to exert control 
over their finances. They can work to increase their tax base or they can cut costs (Yilmaz, et. al., 
2006). However, there are always limits on how much a governmental unit can increase a tax 
base or cut costs to make a significant impact on its bottom line. 
The underlying ideology behind TELs is that if the taxation ability of a governmental unit 
is limited, then spending will also be limited. Theoretically, if spending is limited, this should 
encourage frugality and inhibit excessive spending. What this ideology does not take into 
consideration, however, is that enacting a taxing and spending limit may not necessarily create 
reserve funds, or worse, may severely restrict the ability of a local government to respond to an 
unplanned emergency situation. Without adequate cash reserves, state governments may not 
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have the tools needed to provide immediate services to their citizens, especially during an 
unplanned course of events. However, there has been little empirical work examining what 
political factors are correlated with TEL policy and how it affects state expenditure structures. 
1.2 Statement of the purpose of the study 
This study aims to evaluate the effects of TEL policy on state expenditure structures and 
what types of expenditures are reduced during recession. Specifically, this research empirically 
examines the impact of TELs on state expenditures using panel data for all 50 states during the 
period of 2006 through 2011. This study employs a Random Effect GLS regression with AR ( 1) 
disturbances model that controls for political factors, time trends, population, and serial 
correlations. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: the next section explains the 
definitions, history and variations of TELs in different states, followed by a brief review of 
literature on the subject in the third section. The fourth section describes the data and 
methodology and the fifth section presents empirical research findings. The article concludes in 
the sixth section with a discussion of policy implications and directions for future research. 
1.3 Operational definitions 
• Tax Expenditure Limitation (TEL)- a legal limit passed in an individual state for the 
purpose of either placing a cap on the amount of revenue that a state can raise through tax 
levy, the amount of expenditure that can be incurred, or both. 
• Tax Revoltff axpayer Revolt- period in the late 1970s in the United States in which 
popular sentiment turned against the expansion of government, and indirectly led to the 
passing of several of the first major TELs. 
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• TABOR (Taxpayer Bill of Rights)- The 1992 Colorado state constitutional amendment 
that is arguably the most high-profile TEL initiative since the Taxpayer Revolt. 
• Constitutional TEL- a tax expenditure limitation that is enacted as an amendment to a 
state constitution. 
• Statutory TEL- a tax expenditure limitation that is enacted through legislative action, 
rather than through a popular vote, and is not an amendment to a state constitution. 
• Appropriations- funds which are earmarked for a particular purpose. 
• Per capita- per person (in this case, per state resident/taxpayer). 
• Tax levy- an amount of revenue raised by enacting a tax. 
• Volatility- the amount of positive or negative change from normal state operations (in 
this case, as resultant from enacting a TEL). 
~ • Independent variable- a variable which is not dependent on any other (in this case, the 
TELs). 
• Dependent variable- a variable which is dependent on another variable (in this case, 
expenditures and debt of many different specified types). 
• Control variable- a variable which remains constant throughout a study period (in this 
case, state revenues per capita). 
Chapter 2. Review of the Literature 
2.1 Themes 
2.1.1 History of TELs across the States 
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The TEL movement has been gaining momentum in the United States, as many states 
face budget crises that demand drastic action. TEL initiatives are essentially caps on taxation 
and/or spending that require the approval of either the voting public or elected legislators. These 
initiatives can be seen as primarily a conservative movement as they seek to limit the role of 
government in favor of states' rights and sovereignty. One of the earliest examples of TEL in the 
U.S. occurred in California in the 1970s. Before the economic downturn in 2007, the United 
States experienced another extended period of recession and inflation that led to a massive public 
outcry against government and taxation. Before the Tea Party of the 2000s, there was the Tax 
Revolt of the 1970s. According to Sears and Citrin, the Tax Revolt, "reached its apogee with the 
passage of Proposition 13 (the "Jarvis-Gann amendment") in California, in June 1978 by a 
margin of two-to-one (1982, p. 2). This was the first time an amendment such as this was placed 
on a ballot and won. The aims of this amendment were to provide relief from increasing 
property tax and to explicitly limit the growth of the government of California (Sears & Citrin, 
1982). 
The United States has had a marked history of expansion. This has since become 
emblematic of the American image. Proposition 13 in California marked the beginning of a new 
kind of American patriotism: fiscal conservatism. This was the first time that one of the United 
States purposefully and visibly restricted its own growth and expansion. This measure was the 
result of a popular push for relief from steadily-increasing property taxes in the face of a national 
" 
,. 
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recession. However, Proposition 13 represented a new strategy of limiting growth as a means to 
reducing tax burden. 
In 1979, a further amendment, the "Gann amendment" was passed 74% to 26% in 
California, which further limited the taxation authority of the state (Sears & Citrin, 1982). 
Howard Jarvis, the other half of the Jarvis-Gann amendment, introduced Proposition 9 in 1980, 
which was set to further reduce California income tax, but this measure was roundly rejected by 
the voting public (Sears & Citrin, 1982). It seemed that the first wave of Tax Revolt had begun 
to run its course in only two years. However citizen frustration at the growth of government 
through levies on the public has never completely gone away. 
TABOR in Colorado 
In 1992, the trend towards limiting growth in the United States reached an historic new 
level. This was the year that a Taxpayer Bill of Rights {TABOR) initiative was proposed in 
Colorado as a state constitutional amendment that would place tight controls on the way the state 
government levied taxes and how the revenue was spent. The purported goal was to move 
control of the state's finances from the government and back into the hands of the taxpayers. 
Colorado voters had no way of knowing it at the time, but TABOR would set a precedent for a 
movement that would soon sweep across the nation. 
TABOR was placed on the ballot as Initiative 1 on November 3, 1992 (Ballotpedia, 2014). 
Douglas Bruce, a member of the Colorado State legislature, drafted the proposal and lobbied for 
its inclusion on the ballot. The initiative was ratified by the approved by the voters and enacted 
soon after the election. The purpose of the measure was to require broad voter approval for any 
tax increases that exceeded certain set thresholds. The actual language of the amendment that 
appeared on the ballot is as follows: 
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Shall there be an amendment to the Colorado Constitution to require voter approval for 
certain state and local government tax revenue increases and debt; to restrict property, 
income, and other taxes; to limit the rate of increase in state and local government 
spending; to allow additional initiative and referendum elections; and to provide for the 
mailing of information to registered voters? (Ballotpedia, 2014, n. p. ). 
The purpose of TABOR was to limit the growth of government through the generation of 
revenue by subjecting any increase in revenues, " ... faster than the combined rate of population 
increase and inflation as measured by either the cost of living index at the state level, or growth 
in property values at the local level..." (Ballotpedia, 2014, n.p. ). Any excess funds were to be 
set aside for the funding of educational services and for a contingency fund to use for projects as 
needed. 
There have been many conflicting reports about the success of TABOR in Colorado, 
mostly divided by political affiliation. However, many sweeping changes have taken place in 
Colorado in response to TABOR since the passing of the amendment. Amendment 23 was 
added to the Colorado State constitution in 2000. This stipulated that education spending should 
not be governed by the tenets of the TABOR amendment, and should proceed at an appropriate 
rate regardless of revenue forecasting. This was an effort to negate some of the unintended 
detrimental consequences of TABOR on publicly-delivered education. 
Further reform came to TABOR in 2005 in the form of Referendum C, which, among 
other changes allowed for lawmakers to use the best of the previous five years worth of revenue 
data in order to allocate spending, rather than limiting their focus to the previous year. The goal 
of this referendum was to smooth out the potentially devastating effects of any short-term 
aberrations on the state's economy. Additionally, there have been lawsuits filed regarding the 
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constitutionality of the TABOR initiative, the most recent of which, Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 
resulted in a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decision that the" ... general assembly 
has the standing to challenge the constitutionality of the TABOR amendment ... " (Ballotpedia, et. 
al., 2014). 
The Bell Policy Center created a document in 2003 to review the first ten years of 
Colorado under TABOR. The Bell Policy Center recognizes that the goal of TABOR was to 
restrict the growth of government and they do agree that the proponents of TABOR were 
successful in doing so. The aim of their study is to determine whether or not the effects of this 
tightening of control over government growth have been beneficial for the citizens of Colorado 
and whether or not this is a good model to adopt across the country. 
TABOR in its first ten years, according to the Bell Policy Center, did limit the growth of 
government in Colorado as it was intended to do. In this way, the amendment succeeded. 
However, according to the authors, some unintended consequences of this structurally limited 
growth were Colorado's inability to successfully meet unexpected needs of the citizenry and to 
respond quickly to unanticipated phenomena like economic downturns (Baker, et. al., 2003). 
Additionally, TABOR has created an environment in which not all governmental programs are 
impacted equally. Higher education and public health have suffered the most under TABOR. 
However, due to their dependence on outside forces, such as federal legislation and other 
mandates, programs like corrections and Medicaid have been able to avoid much of the negative 
impact thrust upon other programs under TABOR (Baker, et. al., 2003). This example highlights 
the lack of equity built into the TABOR initiative. 
Perhaps most strikingly, Colorado," ... now ranks 43rd among all states in total tax 
collection as a percentage of income ... " (Baker, et. al., 2005, pg. 4). While it is not clear that 
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this is due entirely to the effects of TABOR, one thing is clear: Coloradoans have paid less in 
local and state taxes since the passage of the amendment. While placing restrictions on the 
amount of taxes that the government can levy was one of the core tenets of TABOR, it was not 
designed to reduce the amount of tax collection as a percentage of citizen's income to a point 
where essential services would be reduced. 
The Bell Policy Center also conducted an experiment with regards to the relative amount 
of tax dollar spending that Colorado engaged itself in during the first ten years of TABOR. Ten 
peer states were chosen for comparison by the Center, and analysis revealed that Colorado's 
increases in spending were less than half of the average growth reported in the peer states (Baker, 
et. al., 2003 ). This created a disconnect between the rate at which the income of the state was 
increasing and that by which the state spending was decreasing during the same time period. 
In enacting TABOR, which set out to create limits on the state government's taxation 
authority along with their ability to spend tax dollars commensurately with increasing revenue or 
increasing need, the State of Colorado effectively diminished their legislators' powers to enact 
make decisions (Baker, et. al., 2003). While this on the surface may represent a success for the 
proponents of the amendment, it also represents the beginning of some long-term unintended 
negative consequences: namely that legislators now have much less leeway to react to and 
resolve high-impact infrequent occurrences such as recessions and emergencies and mitigate 
disasters. What power they once had to enact quick legislation to keep government on track 
during a crisis situation is now severely diminished in favor of fiscal conservativism. As 
legislators gradually become less and less powerful in setting the fiscal and budgetary policies 
for the state, their effectiveness in actually governing the state will diminish commensurately. 
~ ,. 
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One of the few scholarly dissertations on the subject of TABOR in Colorado was 
completed by Zak Brewer at the University of Denver in 2008. Brewer examines the effects that 
TABOR had on Colorado and its citizenry during the recession of2001through2005. Brewer 
posits that due to the restrictive nature of the TABOR amendment, Colorado government was 
unable to quickly respond to the effects of the recession. Lacking knowledge on how long the 
recession conditions would persist, Colorado's government was forced to create piecemeal 
solutions, year to year, using the limited legislational authority they still had at their disposal 
under the restrictions of TABOR. Brewer states, " ... many state departments are caseload driven, 
and thus their budget needs vary with the number of cases ... To the extent that some departments 
experienced budget growth rates below [the threshold] ... while simultaneously experiencing 
caseload growth [above the threshold] ... services delivered ... were reduced ... " (Brewer, 2008, p. 
8). Even if governmental growth stayed well below the threshold that TABOR policy dictated, 
nuances in the way that some governmental services are apportioned out can create deficiencies 
that the framers of the amendment may never have imagined. 
Brewer acknowledges the importance of voter-led referenda in the democratic republican 
government that the United States enjoys. He points out that without such referenda, the voters 
would be forever at the mercy of elected officials, who once elected, were free to create and 
approve laws at their leisure. An essential part of the global checks and balance system, these 
types of referenda are at the heart of what makes the United States a successful experiment. He 
does go on to point out some of the key differences between direct democracies and republican 
democracies or representative democracies. In a representative democracy, voters elect 
representatives who vote on laws using their purported expertise on which they campaign and 
win elections. In a direct democracy, voters vote directly on every issue, which, given the 
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varying educational and social-awareness of the voting bloc, may lead to wildly varied results on 
issues. An informed voter makes the best decisions, and not all voters are equally informed -
problem that can lead to disaster when initiatives are voted for directly (Brewer, 2008). Brewer 
argues that these kind of voter-led referenda, while a valuable part of the checks and balances 
that keep our system strong, may lead to the implantation of flawed laws. Some of the 
unforeseen negative effects of TABOR in Colorado can be evidence of just this type of 
phenomena (Brewer, 2008). 
The Economic Policy Institute issued a briefing report on the economic effects of 
TABOR after a vote in Colorado in 2005 led to a five year suspension of TABOR. To analyze 
why this happened, they engaged in an empirical study ofTABOR's effects on Colorado's 
economy during the time it was in force. They utilized an empirical strategy of comparing 
Colorado with other similar states to analyze their pre- and post-TABOR outlooks. For purposes 
of their study, 1978-1992 was pre-TABOR and 1993-2003 was post-TABOR. Growth in real 
per capita income in Colorado rose from 1 % to 2.10% in the pre- and post-TABOR climates 
(McGuire, T. J. & Rueben, K. S., pg. 6). However, this growth rate was found to be typical of 
the surrounding region (McGuire, T. J. & Rueben, K. S., pg. 6). 
Colorado also experienced a growth in employment rates from 2.39% to 2.42% during 
this period, however most (4%) was concentrated in the first post-TABOR year while 1998-2003 
saw figures ofless than 1 % (McGuire, T. J. & Rueben, K. S., pg. 7). This again is reflective of 
other states in the region. The authors then used regression analysis. The authors found that in 
using both comparative and regression analysis that TABOR did not have a significant positive 
impact on the economy of Colorado (McGuire, T. J. & Rueben, K. S, pg. 10). Colorado did, in 
the authors' estimation, experience a five year short-run boost, but this trend did not continue. 
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The authors actually found that during 1998-2003 Colorado's employment growth was actually 
less than similar states in the region. 
TABOR is stricter than other TELs because it was enacted as an amendment to the state's 
constitution rather than as a statutory law (McGuire, T. J. & Rueben, K. S., pg. 2). 
Since l 992's successfully-implemented TABOR amendment in Colorado, similar ideas 
have popped up in many other states. These TELs initiatives in other states are examined in 
detail below. 
TEL in Alaska 
In 1982, Alaska enacted a constitutional TEL (NCSL, 2010) that was tied in directly to 
the metrics of inflation and population (Shadbegian, 1996). Alaska's TEL called for immediate 
refunds of surpluses (New, 2001 ). The cap on appropriations was set up to change annually 
based on changes in population and inflation (Deller & Stallmann, 2006). This TEL requires a 
supermajority in order to override (Bradley & Lav, 2005). Total expenditures as of 1982 were 
$2.5 billion (Bradley & Lav, 2005). As of 2005, " ... state spending remain[ed] far below that 
inflation-adjusted level." (Bradley & Lav, 2005, p. 4). In the case of Alaska, at least from 1982 
to 2005, the TEL initiative was fiscally successful in achieving its stated goals. 
TEL in Arizona 
Arizona's history with TELs goes back nearly to the beginning of the movement. In 
1978, Arizona enacted a constitutional TEL, which was approved by the voters of the state, 
which limited the appropriations of state tax revenues (Stansel, 1994). The specific limitation in 
this TEL was that tax expenditures are not allowed to exceed seven percent of state personal 
income (Stansel, 1994). In order to override the provisions of the act, a two-thirds majority 
approval from the state legislature was needed (Stansel, 1994). In 1973, five years before the 
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passing of their first TEL, per capita spending was $500, in the year of the TEL, 1978, per capita 
spending was $811, and in 1983, five years after the TEL initiative was passed, per capita 
spending was $1,085 (Stansel, 1994). 
Despite this notable increase in per capita spending after the TEL initiative was put into 
place, there were additional calls for TEL legislation in the following years. Additionally, a 
report by Goldwater Institute in 2005 made a call replacing this TEL with a more stringent 
initiative in the style of Colorado's TABOR. The Goldwater Institute reported that tax levies had 
increased in the period between 1978 and 2005, and that the tenets of the 1978 TEL were too 
lenient. 
Three initiatives containing elements of TEL ideology were in play in Arizona during 
2011: SCR 1026 was a proposed constitutional amendment that would function essentially as 
TABOR in Arizona if passed. Two other bills, HB2707 and SB123 l, were being debated 
concurrently, which set defined limits on taxation and spending much in the vein of TABOR, but 
without the constitutional consequences (Johnson & Williams, 2011). Between 2008 and 2012, 
Arizona state services were subjected to massive cuts as state government responded to 
tremendous budget shortfalls as the result of the economic downturn (Johnson & Williams, 
2011 ). The amount of the cuts totaled roughly 17% of Arizona's total budget (Johnson & 
Williams, 2011). The proposed base year for SCR 1026 was 2013, and like other constitutional 
amendments, would have required a two-thirds majority in each house, approval from the 
Arizona governor, and a statewide referendum to override (Johnson & Williams, 2011 ). This 
would have made responding to emergent situations quickly much more difficult. 
Arizona's 1978 TEL state constitutional amendment is still in place. Proposition 101, as 
it was called on the November 7, 1978 ballot, was voted into law by a margin of 78.2% to 21.8% 
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(Ballotpedia, 2015). Arizona's TEL was enacted as an amendment to the Arizona Constitution, 
Article IX (Ballotpedia, 2015). 
TEL in California 
California is the state in which the taxpayer's revolt is said to have begun in modem 
times. The taxpayer revolt that ultimately led to the tax expenditure limitation movement has 
been traced back to homeowner unhappiness with rapidly increasing property taxes during the 
1970s. The California Supreme Court ruled that," ... reliance on local property taxes to finance 
public schools was unconstitutional because of the wide disparities in taxable property among 
school districts," (Fischel, 1989, p. 465) in the case of Serrano v. Priest in 1971. This ruling 
changed the way that state taxation could be used to cover needed state expenditures. Since 
there were no clear rules on how to better handle the issue of inequality in the collection and 
application of property taxes in paying for school expenditures, many communities took the 
problem into their own hands. 
When the state of California attempted to move forward in compliance with the Serrano 
ruling, problems arose. Funds were "added to a previous program so that poor districts got 
proportionately more money," (Fischel, 1989, p. 465). This led to unrest among voting property 
owners who felt that expenditures were being spent in ways contrary to their wishes. Furtehr 
decisions such as Serrano II, required that spending on each student across all districts should be 
within a $100 range of each other (Fischel, 1989). Additionally, Serrano III, and other laws of 
the late 1970s, placed additional restrictions on wealthier districts, transferring the tax 
expenditures further to poorer districts (Fischel, 1989). Fischel 's hypothesis on this is that, 
"Proposition 13 was a rational response by voters who were faced with the implementation of 
Serrano" (1989, p. 467). This was, simply, a backlash from voters, upset with the way the 
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expenditures of their tax revenues were being implemented. They wanted more say on how their 
money was spent, and this led to the feeling that government bureaucrats were engaged in 
overspending. Proposition 13 had larger majority support in higher income brackets (Fischel, 
1989), showing that taxpayer revolt may have resulted from higher income taxpayers upset over 
having taxes levied upon them to pay for social causes that did not interest them. California's 
constitutional TEL, enacted in 1979, is still in place as of the writing of this paper (NCSL, 2010). 
TEL in Connecticut 
In 1991, Connecticut passed a statute-based TEL designed to limit spending, which 
would limit spending to a formula based on the greater of either the average of growth in 
personal income during the previous five years or the previous year's change in inflation (Deller 
& Stallmann, 2006). In 1992, Connecticut further strengthened their commitment to the TEL 
movement by passing a constitutional amendment that would require a two-thirds legislative 
majority to override (Stansel, 1994). In the years of 2000 through 2004, property tax collections 
per capita actually went up from $1,742 to $1,944, with intergovernmental aid from state 
relatively flat, but slightly decreased, going from $1,083 in 2000 and $1,010 in 2004 (Dye and 
Reschovsky, 2004). Dye and Rechovsky posit that local governments respond to," ... cuts in 
state aid by raising property taxes," (2004, pg. 87). 
Connecticut's spending cap "applies to all state spending except payments on state debt, 
state grants to distressed municipalities, and first year expenditures on federal mandates or court 
orders," (Brome & Saas, 2006, p.6). Possibly due in part to this cap, the transportation fund and 
general fund expenditures of Connecticut increased by 6 percent between 1990 and 2005 (Brome 
& Sass, 2006). 
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TEL in Delaware 
Delaware instituted a constitutional TEL of its own in 1978 (NCSL, 2010). Delaware's 
TEL limited its expenditures to " ... 98 percent of estimated general funds plus the previous years' 
unencumbered funds," (Shadbegian, 1996, 23). During the 1990 - 1991 U.S. recession, 
Delaware experienced tax increases and expenditure shortfalls (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). 
Expenditure shortfalls were $9.2 million in 1989, $13.2 million in 1990, $48.3 million in 1991 
and $144.2 million in 1992 (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996, pg. 34). Tax increases that may have 
been instituted due to these expenditure shortfalls were $9.2 million in 1991 and $83.6 million in 
1992 (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). There were no tax increases in 1989 or 1990 (Sobel & 
Holcombe, 1996). Sobel and Holcombe discuss the purpose of rainy day funds in state 
governments, which are to act as safeguards against unexpected shortfalls or disasters which are 
not part of normal regular operations or targeted strategic growth ( 1996). TELs are set up in part 
to help create rainy day funds. If rainy day funds are supposed to "help a state maintain its 
expenditure growth while reducing its need to raise taxes during a recession," (Sobel & 
Holcombe, 1996, pg. 33). If this is the case, then during the 1990-1992 recession, the Delaware 
TEL failed in its mission. 
TEL in Florida 
Florida activists have been attempting to enact TEL legislation for at least twenty years. 
In 1994, pro-TEL supporters submitted a petition to allow a proposal for a constitutional 
amendment to be put before state voters which would have required voter approval for any 
subsequent tax increases or new tax legislation (Poulson, 2004). This was rejected by the Florida 
Supreme Court (Poulson, 2004). The Florida legislature then submitted their own TEL 
amendment before voters on a statewide ballot that would " ... limit [revenue] linked to the 
growth of state personal income," (Poulson, 2004, p. 12). 
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Florida is a "fiscally conservative state" (Holcombe, 2015, p. 3), without personal income 
tax or estate tax. Additionally, Florida is "one of the very lowest states in state government 
expenditures per capita" (Holcombe, 2015, p. 3). The constitutional revenue limitation which 
was put into place by the state legislature after the failed 1994 bid for such a TEL, is, according 
to Holcombe," ... weaker ... " (Holcombe, 2015, p. 14) than the original proposed TEL, and 
subsequently, the" ... constitutional cap on state revenues .... has never been binding," (Holcombe, 
2015, p. 14). 
After intense deliberation throughout 2008, Florida tabled a new, more stringent TEL 
initiative, concerned about reduced funding for police, fire, roads and schools (Ray, 2008, n. p.). 
Many in Florida had grown concerned about the continued viability of TEL for Florida, 
especially after reviewing the issues that were encountered with Colorado's TABOR amendment. 
In a state such as Florida which is often hit with powerful hurricanes, TELs could potentially 
restrict spending in such a way to increase risk and reduce the flexibility needed to respond 
quickly to unexpected phenomena. Further, powerful unions such as AFSCME Florida opposed 
the new bill. The Taxation and Budget Reform Commission declined to put the issue on a ballot. 
The very voters that this bill would have further empowered were not allowed to vote on it. 
Eventually, this sentiment led to the placing of Florida's Amendment 3 on the November, 
2012 ballot. Arizona governor Jan Brewer had previously vetoed a similar measure the year 
before, but still the conservative movement continued to build momentum throughout the state. 
Again, estimates were touted from both sides of the aisle about the possible effects of this type of 
amendment. The legislature itself presented calculations showing that if the amendment had 
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been in place since 1994, Florida would only have exceeded the cap once, and that revenues 
were projected to fall under the cap through 2020 (Deslatte, 2012). On the other hand, the 
Center of Budget and Policy Priorities calculated that under the same circumstances, Florida 
state revenues would have been reduced by $11 billion during a decade, with expected cuts 
hitting education the hardest, and the threat of Florida's credit and bond ratings diminishing 
(Deslatte, 2012). This proposed amendment was eventually put up for voter referendum in 2012, 
where it was defeated. 
TEL in Hawaii 
Hawaii instituted an expenditure-limiting TEL in 1978 (Shadbegian, 1996) as a 
constitutional initiative (Kousser, et. al., 2008). The expenditure limitation applies to the state 
general fund and appropriations (Stansel, 1994). Specifically, the limitation prohibited yearly 
growth from exceeding a combination of the annual rate of change in state personal income for 
an aggregate total of the previous three calendar years (Stansel, 1994). To override, two thirds of 
the state legislature would need to approve (Stansel, 1994). Per capita spending in state total 
general expenditure increased by $412 in the first five years after its 1978 enactment (Stansel, 
1994). This result is obviously not what was intended by the framers of this constitutional tax 
expenditure limitation. 
TEL in Idaho 
In 1980, Idaho enacted a legislative statutory TEL tied to income (Kousser, et. al., 2008). 
The specific limit is that expenditures are not allowed to exceed state personal income by 5.33 
percent (Stansel, 1994). In order to override this TEL, two thirds of the legislature must approve 
(Stansel, 1994). During the five years after this TEL was introduced, per capita spending would 
increase from $971 to $1250 (Stansel, 1994). What is interesting about the Idaho statutory TEL 
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is that one-time expenditures are exempt from this limitation (Deller & Stallmann, 2006). 
During the fiscal crisis of 1990 - 1991, there were no expenditure shortfalls, however, there were 
several tax increases including, $13 million in 1989, $10 million in 1990, $13 million in 1991 
and $26.2 million in 1992 (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). Surpluses that were used during this 
same recessionary period totaled $59 million between 1989 and 1992 (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). 
During this one particularly rough patch in US economic history, Idaho, while observing its 1980 
statutory TEL, did not increase expenditures, but did increase taxes and use surpluses in the 
millions of dollars. 
In more recent years, Republican Idaho State Representative Ken Roberts introduced a 
proposed TEL constitutional amendment in 2004. Two other republican State Representatives, 
Lenore Barrett and JoAnn Wood had also proposed TABOR-styled initiatives before this 
{Times-News Editorial Staff, et. al., 2004). The amendment would enact a cap on state 
appropriations to no more than the level of the previous year plus inflation and the percentage 
change in population {Times-News Editorial Staff, et. al., 2004). As with most TEL initiatives, 
the planned extra funds would be placed in reserve funds for emergencies, subject to referendum 
or legislative vote. Conversely, if funds are not sufficient to cover debts, a referendum would 
take place to make the necessary appropriations. This Idaho TEL amendment never made it to 
the ballot. 
TEL in Indiana 
Indiana adopted a statutory TEL in 2002 which sought to limit spending by setting a 
spending cap to be determined by a formula on a biennial basis (Deller & Stallmann, 2006). 
According to Conlan, et. al., Indiana's TEL is of the least possible stringency and is not subject 
to line-item veto (2015). After the recession of2007, many states had problems with both 
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r revenues and expenditures. For taxes enacted in 2008 and 2009, Indiana had, " ... raised taxes by 
more than 5 percent of the prior year's colections (Johnson, et. al., 2010, p.l). Further, for the 
same period, Indiana increased the sales tax by 1 full percent, up from 6 percent, resulting in an 
overall increase of revenue of nearly $1 billion (Johnson, et. al., 2010). This is another instance 
of a TEL not doing what it was set out to do. It is perhaps because of the lack of stringency of 
this TEL that it was not successful, but the analysis of the 2008 - 2009 tax activity, it is clear that 
the TEL had failed in at least part of its stated purpose. 
TEL in Iowa 
In 1992, the legislature of the state of Iowa passed a statutory TEL (NCSL, 2010), (New, 
2001 ). This TEL limited appropriations to 99% of the state's yearly estimate of adjusted revenue 
(Deller & Stallmann, 2006). With this TEL in place, the budget gap for Iowa in fiscal year 2009 
was $350 million (McNichol & Lav, 2008). It is important to note that this gap is before 
accounting for the TEL (McNichol & Lav, 2008). In 2005, Schunk and Woodwood posited that 
Iowa would not have, " ... adequate reserves to weather a protracted recession without tax 
hikes ... " (2005, p. 113). This was two years before the 2007 recession began and 13 years after 
the initiation of Iowa's TEL. 
TEL in Louisiana 
Louisiana also had a very early TEL initiative in place. Louisiana's TEL was 
implemented in 1979, along with similar measures that year in California, Nevada, Utah and 
Washington (Shadbegian, 1996). The 1979 TEL set a revenue limit, capping the growth at a 
limit equal to the growth of state personal income (Shadbegian, 1996). There were no provisions 
for immediate returns of surpluses under this TEL (New, 2001) 
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Additionally, a constitutional TEL was adopted in Louisiana in 1991 capping revenue, 
and another in 1993 capping spending (Kousser, et. al., 2008). They were both tied to income 
(Kousser, et. al., 2008). The 1993 constitutional TEL was enacted via referenda, and like the 
1979 TEL, allowed for no immediate returns of surpluses (New, 2001 ). During the recession of 
1990-1991, Louisiana experienced expenditure shortfalls of 49. 7 million in 1989, and increased 
taxes by 320 million in 1989, 254 million in 1990, 359.8 million in 1991and662.80 million in 
1992 (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). So, while Louisiana did not experience much expenditure 
shortfall between 1989 and 1992, they ultimately increased taxes by hundreds of millions of 
dollars per year during that same period (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). 
TEL in Maine 
November 3, 2009 saw the defeat of a proposed TABOR amendment on the ballot in 
Maine. The proposal was entitled Question 4 (Lav, 2009). The proposal, entitled "An Act to 
Promote Tax Relief' was similar in spirit to a TABOR referendum that had been voted down by 
Maine citizens in 2006 (Collins and Lav, 2006). This proposed amendment would limit the 
expansion of state spending to an amount commensurate with population increases and inflation 
(Saviello, 2009). 20 percent of the excess in general and highway fund budgets would be 
transferred to a "rainy day" fund, and the remaining 80 percent to a tax relief fund (Saviello, 
2009). This amendment has not currently passed. 
This is not to say that Maine does not have a TEL in place, just not a constitutional 
initiative. Maine enacted a statewide statutory spending limit in 2005 which places limits on 
state appropriations relative to average personal income growth (Waisanen, 2010). It is 
important to note here that while Maine currently operates under this spending limits, voters 
have roundly rejected proposed constitutional amendments to require approval from voters 
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before any tax increase could be enacted and other such TABOR-like measures in both 2006 and 
2009. 
TEL in Massachusetts 
In 1986, Massachusetts attempted to implement a TEL that would place a limit revenues 
to the, " ... growth in state employee wages [and] require that state revenues must decrease if 
local revenues increase, and vice versa," (Blankenau & Skidmore, 2002, p. 64). Ultimately, a 
statutory TEL which limited revenue generation was pushed through as an initiative, and 
remained in place in Massachusetts from 1986-2002 (Mitchell, 2010). In 2002, it was amended 
to tie its limits to inflation (NCSL, 2010). Prior to this, Massachusetts had in place a measure 
called Proposition 2 Yz which was passed in 1980 and limited increases in property taxation to 
2.5% a year ( 1891h General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2015). It is clear 
from this history that Massachusetts has been involved in that taxpayer revolt movement nearly 
since its inception. 
TEL in Maryland 
Maryland State Delegate Warren Miller introduced a TEL in the form ofHB 36 in 2009. 
Support came early from the National Taxpayers Union (NTU) who calculated a $9 billion dollar 
savings that would have occurred between 2006 and 2009 if the TEL bill had been passed three 
years earlier (Moylan, 2009, n. p.). Maryland does not currently have any major statewide TEL 
in place. 
TEL in Michigan 
In 2007, the Senate Fiscal Agency of the State of Michigan began to estimate what the 
effects of TABOR may have been on their state had it been enacted during the 1995-1996 fiscal 
year. Their determination was that the 2006-2007 fiscal year would have seen state 
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appropriations approximately $68 million less under TABOR (Association of Governing Boards, 
2014). The findings of the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, a 
group with the expressed purpose of," ... advancing the practice of citizen trusteeship ... " 
(Association of Governing Boards, 2014), state that TABOR would have had other unforeseen 
consequences on Michigan had it been in force during this time. Namely, that between the fiscal 
years of 1995-1996 and 2006-2007, state appropriations were in excess of what the TABOR 
limits would have been by as much as $9 billion in some years. TABOR would have " ... limited 
appropriations to more than $2 billion less than actual appropriations." (Association of 
Governing Boards, 2014). 
Eventually, after the measure had been proposed, the Michigan Board of State 
Canvassers met and voted to not certify the TABOR initiative. The reasons that they gave were 
somewhat ambiguous. They said that they were concerned over the amendment language and 
they believed that there were duplicate or invalid signatures in the petition to put the amendment 
up for a vote (Association of Governing Boards, 2014). 
Michigan is not without any TEL constitutional initiatives, however. Michigan has had a 
constitutional TEL in place since 1978, near the beginning of the taxpayer revolt movement. 
This TEL limited revenue to," ... l % over 9.49% of the previous year's state personal income," 
(Waisanen, 2010). TEL activists in Michigan may simply believe that their existing TEL is not 
stringent enough for their state's needs. 
TEL in Minnesota 
TABOR was introduced into the Minnesota House of Representatives on March 22, 2006 
as House File 3840 (Minnesota Budget Project, 2006). The Minnesota TABOR proposal would 
have applied to all state and local governments, with school districts singled out for separate and 
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more stringent spending limits (Minnesota Budget Project, 2006). Growth in spending, like with 
many other of these types of proposals would have been limited to a combination of inflation 
plus population growth and be subject to change only by referendum. This includes any 
increases in school district levies needed to offset enrollment changes (Minnesota Budget Project, 
2006). The previous year's spending was to be the benchmark for all calculations. A 
referendum could only be achieved by three-fourths of the members of each house voting to refer 
the measure for popular voting (Minnesota Budget Project, 2006). The bill was not put up for 
hearing during the 2006 Minnesota legislative hearing and has not been proposed since. 
TEL in Mississippi 
Mississippi enacted a TEL via the state legislature in 1992 (New, 2001). However, 
Mississippi already had a statutory TEL on appropriations, which was enacted a decade earlier in 
r 1982, which limited appropriations to 98% of the state's projected revenue (Deller & Stallmann, 
' 2006). Further, Mississippi has a long-standing tradition of attempting to limit the taxation 
authority of the state, going back even prior to the so-called taxpayer revolt era of the late 1970s. 
Mississippi required a three-fifth supermajority in order to increase any taxes in the state going 
back as far as 1970 (Heckleman & Dougherty, 2010). Clearly, Mississippi has felt strongly 
about limiting the state's ability to increase taxes for quite some time. 
TEL in Missouri 
Missouri has had a spending cap TEL in place since 1980 (Shadbegian, 1996). This 
spending cap was a constitutional initiative that was passed by the voters of the state (Stansel, 
1994). An additional constitutional revenue limit was passed in 1996 (Kousser, et. al., 2008). 
Per capita spending went up from $736 in 1980, the year of the TELs implementation, to $1,082 
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in 1985 (Stansel, 1994). This continued Missouri's upward trend of per capita spending that had 
been going on since at least 1975 when per capita spending was $466 (Stansel, 1994). 
TEL in Montana 
Montana has had an expenditure limitation on the books since 1981 (Shadbegian, 1996). 
It was a statutory initiative passed by the state legislature (Stansel, 1994). In order to authorize 
further expenditures, either a declaration of emergency from the governor is required, or 
approval from two thirds of the state legislature must be obtained (Stansel, 1994). Per capita 
spending increased from $770 in 197 6, to $1, 181 in 1981 (they year the TEL was enacted), up to 
$1, 705 in 1986 (Stansel, 1994). Per capita spending did not seem to be slowed by the TEL. 
Perhaps because of this failure to control per capita spending, several other TEL 
initiatives have been planned in the years since the 1981 TEL was implemented. In 1994, further 
supermajority requirements were put on the state ballot (Stansel, 1994). In 2006, the "Stop 
OverSpending" bill was introduced into the Montana House. It was proposed as Constitutional 
Initiative 97 (CI-97) and was planned to be included on the November 2006 Montana ballot. It 
was essentially TABOR as it was proposed as a constitutional amendment and it limited growth 
based on inflation and population growth. It was slated to be placed on a ballot after supporters 
were able to procure enough petition signatures to allow the measure to be put up for popular 
vote (Ballotpedia, 2014). However, opponents filed a lawsuit charging that CI-97 violated 
Montana's single-subject rule (Ballotpedia, 2014). Their contention was that this bill addressed 
more than one subject, and therefore could not be voted on as a constitutional amendment. This 
has not since been placed on a ballot. 
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TEL in Nebraska 
Initiative Measure 423, or the Nebraska Spending Limit Amendment, was put up for 
public vote on November 7, 2006. If it had passed, it would have been the second TABOR state 
constitutional amendment in the United States. It was voted down 67% to 28% by the voters of 
Nebraska (Ballotpedia, 2014). 
TEL in Nevada 
Nevada passed a very early TEL in 1979, in the wake of the taxpayer revolt of the late 
1970s which set limits only on the governor's annual budget proposal (New, 2001). This TEL 
did not have a direct effect on revenue generating or actual spending (New, 2001 ). The 
expenditures in the governor's proposed annual budget are held to not exceed the," ... biennial 
percentage growth in state population and inflation," (Deller & Stallmann, 2006, p. 546). 
TEL in New Jersey 
New Jersey had one of the earliest TELs in place in the US, implemented in 1976, and 
focusing on limiting state expenditures (Shadbegian, 1996). New Jersey's TEL is widely viewed 
as being the first true state TEL (Stansel, 1994). It was passed by the New Jersey state 
legislature, and did not provide for an immediate return of any surpluses (New, 2001). This TEL, 
however, was temporary, and expired in 1983 (New, 2001). Subsequently, another TEL was 
passed in New Jersey by the state legislature in 1990 (New, 2001). This TEL also did provide 
for immediate return of surpluses (New, 2001). In New Jersey, voters are able to override the 
TEL in cases of emergency when more debt may need to be issued (Poterba & Rueben, 1999). 
In 1993, a poll conducted in New Jersey showed that 60 percent of voters would 
" ... prefer lower taxes and fewer services ... " as opposed to 33 percent who said they felt the 
opposite (Stansel, 1994, n.p.). New Jersey has been an early supporter of placing limits on 
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taxation and expenditures, and, if the polls are to be believed, this sentiment is coming squarely 
from the voters. 
TEL in North Carolina 
North Carolina had been mulling a TABOR-like initiative starting as far back as 1979. 
However, the proposals never got off the ground through those years. According to Balfour, 
North Carolina was dramatically increasing the size of their government irrespective of the 
economic climate during this time. In his words, "A review of the 30-year period from ... 1979 to 
2009 ... shows that North Carolina's state budget- even after adjusting for inflation -more than 
tripled in the 30 years preceding the current ["Great"] recession ... " (Balfour, 2013, n. p.). 
Spending during this period also grew disproportionately to population increase. This is notable 
because during this period, specifically in 1991, North Carolina passed a statutory spending limit 
tied to income (Kousser, 2008). 
The TABOR initiative favored by Balfour would set spending growth limits between 4 
and 5 percent annually, down from the historically seen amounts of 8 to 9 percent per year 
(Balfour, 2013). This is a concept that North Carolina residents appear to favor as a poll 
indicated that likely voters would accept such a measure by a 49 percentage point margins 
(Balfour, 2013). A Civitas Institute poll yielded a result of 66 percent of those polled favoring a 
measure of this type with only 18 percent opposed (Balfour, 2013). 
This TABOR amendment was proposed for the November 2012 ballot in North Carolina; 
however it did not meet the required 60% vote of each house of the North Carolina State 
Legislature in order to qualify for the ballot (Ballotpedia, 2014). It has not since been proposed 
and has never been on a ballot in North Carolina. Currently, only the 1991 statutory TEL has 
placed any kind of limits on spending and taxation in North Carolina. 
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TEL in Ohio 
Expenditure shortfalls and tax increases during the 1990 - 1991 economic downturn in 
Ohio were notable. Expenditure shortfalls totaled $423.3 million in 1989, $143.7 million in 
1990, $19.8 million in 1991 and $0 in 1992 (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). During the same period, 
tax increases totaled $0 in 1989, $166.1 million in 1990, $170. 7 million in 1991, and $326.0 
million in 1992 (Sobel & Holcombe, 1996). Expenditure shortfalls decreased, however tax 
increases increased during this time period, showing a very volatile state economy. Ohio did 
eventually institute a TEL that is statutory and was passed by the Ohio state legislature in 2006, 
and is designed to limit spending (Mitchell, 2010). 
TEL in Oklahoma 
Oklahoma implemented an expenditure-limiting TEL in 1985 (Shadbegian, 1996). This 
TEL is constitutional and tied to inflation (Kousser, 2008). It was placed on a ballot and passed 
by Oklahoma voters (New, 2001). Additionally, in 1992, a constitutional amendment was 
passed in Oklahoma placing more stringent measures for implementing tax expenditures, 
specifically requiring any new tax expenditures to pass both houses of the state legislature, 
" ... with a three-fourths majority or be approved by a majority of voters," (New, 2001, n.p.). In 
the five years after the implementation of the Oklahoma TEL, per capita spending increased 
from $1,323 in 1985 to $1,784 in 1990 (Stansel, 1994). 
TEL in Oregon 
Oregon was another early adopter of TEL, with a TEL in place since 1979 (Thompson & 
Green, 2004). This TEL, ORS 291.355, was created as a statute in the Oregon state legislature 
(Legislative Fiscal Office of Oregon, 2003). This TEL limited,'' ... state general fund 
appropriations to the rate of growth in personal income over the previous two calendar years and 
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returning excess revenues, that is, more than 2 percent greater than budgeted, to the taxpayers," 
(Thompson & Green, 2004, p. 83). Oregon further instituted a constitutional TEL limiting 
revenue in 2000 and a statutory TEL on spending in 200 l (NCSL, 2010). 
Oregon is one of a few states without a, " ... broad-based income tax," (Thompson & 
Green, 2004, p. 74). The state has a history of placing limits on taxes and expenditures at the 
will of state voters. More recently, Measure 48, Oregon's version of TABOR, was placed on the 
November 7, 2006 ballot for popular vote. Supporters of the measure spent $1.3 million on a 
campaign to extol its virtues, while opponents spent nearly $3.3 million on a campaign to 
discredit the initiative (Ballotpedia, 2014). The bill was defeated 71 percent to 29 percent and 
has not since returned to the ballot in Oregon. 
TEL in Rhode Island 
Rhode Island has another very early TEL, implemented in 1977 and limiting expenditures 
(Shadbegian, 1996). However, this TEL was nonbinding, and as such, not particularly effective 
at placing real limits on actual spending and taxation (New, 2001 ). In 1992, Rhode Island passed 
a constitutional TEL to limit appropriations in an effort to strengthen their efforts towards TEL 
principles (NCSL, 2010). 
In 2006, a TEL was introduced in Rhode Island by House Bill 7485, which would have 
tied any increases into increases in the Consumer Price Index (Rhode Island Federation of 
Teachers and Health Professionals, 2006). The effort was not successful and has not since been 
re-introduced. 
TEL in South Carolina 
South Carolina implemented an expenditure-based TEL in 1980 (Shadbegian, 1996). 
This TEL is constitutional and tied to the greater of income or inflation (Kousser, et. al., 2008). 
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This TEL can be overridden by a declaration of emergency by the state governor, and a 
legislative vote majority of two thirds (Stansel, 1994). The limits are up for legislative review 
every five years (Stansel, 1994 ). Of note, the, " ... five-year growth rate of spending in South 
Carolina rose from 18.7 percentage points below the U.S. average before TEL enactment to 3.0 
percentage points above the U.S. average after TEL enactment," (Stansel, 1994, n.p.). 
TEL in Tennessee 
According to Mary Perren of the Williamson Herald, prior to a 2006 push for a taxpayer 
bill of rights amendment to the Tennessee state constitution, there were already caps on spending 
in place. Known as the Copeland Cap, these spending limits were in place since a 1978 
constitutional referendum put them on the ballot and they were passed overwhelmingly by the 
citizenry of Tennessee. However, they were easily and often overridden by a simple majority in 
the state House of Representatives (Perren, 2006). 
One of the biggest issues with TELs is the initiative's crippling effect on legislators 
during times of unexpected crisis. According to Perren, this was deliberately addressed in the 
drafting of the Tennessee proposal. The Republican senators who drafted the bill increased the 
majority needed to override to two thirds of the house (Perren, 2006). This would effectively 
create a way to still create legislation in times of crisis while still keeping intact the integrity of 
their call to limit the governmental authority to levy taxes and spend tax dollars. And, as with 
many TEL initiatives, the funds that are to be saved through the restriction of spending would be 
set aside in a so-called "rainy day" fund to better prepare for such emergencies. This 2006 
effort, however, did not make it to the Tennessee ballot. 
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TEL in Texas 
Texas was another early adopter of TEL in state government, implementing an 
expenditure-limiting TEL in 1978, at the very beginning of the taxpayer revolt (Shadbegian, 
1996). Texas' TEL was tied to the growth of state personal income (Shadbegian, 1996). The 
1978 TEL was a constitutional initiative (Kousser, et. al., 2008). It was enacted via a referendum, 
and provided no provision for immediate return of surpluses (New, 2001). 
TEL in West Virginia 
As recently as January, 2014, the West Virginia House finance committee was reviewing 
a TABOR amendment, HJR 28 (Open States, 2014). This proposal was similar to most other 
TABOR initiatives in structure. It was one of a recent wave of TABOR-style amendments to 
come about in the post-Colorado TABOR era. According to LegiScan, this bill met the fate of 
some of the other TABOR-style amendments across the states in recent years, and" ... died in 
committee," (2016, n.p.). It has not since been put up for referendum. 
TEL in Utah 
Utah was involved in the early days of TEL, however, chose not to fully implement their 
1979 expenditure-limiting TEL (Shadbegian, 1996). This proposed 1979 TEL would have set a 
limit of," ... 85% of growth in state personal income," (Shadbegian, 1996, p. 24). In 1979, the 
year of the proposed implementation of the Utah TEL, per capita spending was $974 (Stansel, 
1994). Five years later, in 1984, per capita spending had risen to $1,350 (Stansel, 1994). 
A real Utah spending limit was passed ten years after the original proposed TEL in 1989 
as a statute, tied to both income and inflation (Kousser, et. al., 2007). Kousser pointed out that 
Utah had traditionally been a state with a, " ... frugal state budget, in keeping with its political 
culture," (2007, p. 40), which makes it odd that they would need to pass a limit on taxation or 
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spending as an official statutory measure. Kousser further points out that the TEL has been 
unsuccessful in slowing or restraining growth, with state and local spending growing through the 
1990s (2007). 
TEL in Washington 
The voters of Washington State passed their own TEL with I-601 in 1993, which was 
likely modeled on the Colorado TABOR. I-601 set a cap on state expenditures of the inflation 
rate plus population growth (New, 2005, pg. 3). However, this was not a constitutional 
amendment like other TABOR initiatives, and further, was overturned by the Washington 
Supreme Court on grounds of unconstitutionality on February 28, 2013 (Ballotpedia, 2014). 
Between fiscal years 2013 and 2014, Washington experienced an increase of approximately $1.9 
billion in total government spending (Ballotpedia, 2015). 
TEL in Wisconsin 
Wisconsin has had a statutory TEL in place since 2001, which sets a spending limit on 
spending, specifically limiting it to the personal income growth rate (Deller & Stallmann, 2006). 
This was put into place after a TEL initiative was defeated on a 1994 Wisconsin ballot (Stansel, 
1994). 
The TABOR amendment which was proposed in Wisconsin in 2006 was called the 
Taxpayer Protection Amendment (Murray, 2006). According to Murray, a then-recent 
Wisconsin Homeowner's Alliance poll showed that 64 percent of those surveyed would favor 
and vote for a TEL constitutional amendment (Murray, 2006). Clearly, there existed ground-
level support for such an initiative amongst Wisconsin's voters. With a property tax listed in 
2004 at 11th highest in the nation and the state's consistently being ranked among the top five 
most heavily taxed states (Sykes, 2004), the stage was set for this kind of groundswell. 
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Taking another view of Wisconsin is Reschovsky, who argues that the Wisconsin 
property tax burden had been falling for the ten year period of 1994- 2004 (2004). He attributes 
the surge of enthusiasm for putting limits on taxation and spending to surveys containing leading 
questions that are administered for the expressed purpose of drumming up support for TEL 
(2004). Between 1994 and 2001, he posits, Wisconsin property owners enjoyed a 17% reduction 
in tax burden (2004). Business taxes are also low, according to Reschovsky, with Wisconsin 
ranking 50th in business taxes as a share of total state and local taxes (2004). Wisconsin also 
ranked 19th in total state and local government spending in relation to total income (2004). In 
other words, Wisconsin was not in as dire of a situation as those proposing TABOR may have 
led on. In fact, Wisconsin had unusually low business taxes as compared to personal taxes, and 
the result of this policy may have been an increased tax burden on private citizens, not 
government overspending. 
As with many of the other TEL initiatives across the nation, the Wisconsin Taxpayer 
Protection Amendment did not pass both houses of the state legislature, and did not appear for 
public vote on any ballot. It has not since appeared on any Wisconsin ballot. 
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T bl 1 Ch rt f St t "th TEL I I d d . th. Stud a e . a 0 a esw1 S DC U e ID IS IY . 
Alaska Constitutional 1982 
Arizona Constitutional 1978 
California Constitutional 1979 
Colorado Constitutional 1992 Suspended for five years starting in 2005 
Connecticut Statutory 1991 
Constitutional 1992 
Delaware Constitutional 1978 
Florida Constitutional 1994 
Hawaii Constitutional 1978 
Idaho Statutory 1980 
Indiana Statutory 2002 
Iowa Statutory 1992 
Louisiana Constitutional 1991 To limit revenue 
Constitutional 1993 To limit spending 
Maine Statutory 2005 
Massachusetts Statutory 1986 Amended in 2002 
Michigan Constitutional 1978 
Mississiooi Statutory 1982 
Statutory 1992 
Missouri Constitutional 1980 
Constitutional 1996 
Montana Statutory 1981 
Nevada Statutory 1979 
New Jersey Statutory 1976 
Statutory 1990 
North Carolina Statutory 1991 
Ohio Statutory 2006 
Oklahoma Constitutional 1985 
Oregon Statutory 1979 
Constitutional 2000 To limit revenue 
Statutory 2001 To limit spending 
Rhode Island Nonbinding 1977 
Constitutional 1992 To limit aoorooriations 
South Carolina Constitutional 1980 
Tennessee Constitutional 1978 
Texas Constitutional 1978 
Utah Statutory 1989 
Washington Statutory 1993 Overturned by State Supreme Court, 2013 
Wisconsin Statutory 2001 
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T bl 2 Ch a e : art o fM . TEL I .. f h us . a.1or mtia 1ves m t e .• smce 1992 
State Year Proposed On Ballot? Results Issues 
Arizona 2011 No Not Implemented Vetoed by Governor 
Colorado 1992 Yes Implemented Reduced in scope through legislation 
Connecticut 2006 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Florida 1994 Yes Implemented 
Florida 2012 Yes Not Implemented Defeated bv popular vote 
Idaho 2004 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Indiana 2002 Yes Implemented 
Louisiana 1993 Yes Implemented 
Maine 2005 Yes Implemented 
Maine 2009 Yes Not Implemented Defeated by popular vote 
Maryland 2009 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Michigan 2007 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Minnesota 2006 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Missouri 1996 Yes Implemented 
Montana 2006 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Nebraska 2006 Yes Not Implemented Defeated bv popular vote 
North Carolina 2009 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Oregon 2001 Yes Implemented 
Oregon 2002 Yes Implemented 
Oregon 2006 Yes Not Implemented Defeated by popular vote 
Ohio 2006 Yes Implemented 
Rhode Island 2006 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Tennessee 2006 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Washington 1993 Yes Implemented Overturned in 2013 
West Virginia 2014 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
Wisconsin 2006 No Not Implemented Did not make it to ballot 
2.1.2 Historical and contemporary analysis of TELs across the states 
The study of effects of TELs is a relatively young field of study because TELs 
themselves date back only to the late 20th century. Fischel ( 1989) wrote extensively about 
Proposition 13 in California just a decade after its adoption. Proposition 13, which was a state 
constitutional amendment in California was approved by voters by a 2 to 1 margin in June of 
I 978. Fischel argues that the passing of Proposition 13 may be resultant from fallout from the 
case of Serrano v. Priest, which, "divorce[d] local property wealth from school spending ... thus 
~ convert[ing] most property taxes into a deadweight loss (1989, p. 465). Fischel posits that 
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sentiment among California voters at the time was that there was rampant overspending ( 1989). 
Serrano v. Priest was a case regarding the constitutionality of using property tax funds to fund 
public schools. The finding of the case was that relying on local resources in order to fund 
public schools was unconstitutional because of the nature of the wildly varying tax bases among 
regions in the state (Fischel, 1989). Basically the finding of the case was that some school 
districts would be better funded than others because their respective tax bases were better off 
than others. Therefore, the way the schools were funded would be inequitable. How could 
California police the process of funding schools under such a court finding? The solution that 
the California state legislature arrived at was a plan to move towards equalizing school funding 
by setting caps on the revenue usage in more well-to-do districts, while enhancing the funding of 
schools in less well-to-do districts (Fischel, 1989). On paper, this made great strides towards 
normalizing the conditions among schools. However, in practice, this upset great swaths of the 
voting public in California, especially those in more well-to-do districts, who believed that they 
were paying more of their fair share to cover districts with more limited resources (Fischel, 
1989). 
In 1976, a subsequent case colloquially called Serrano II went even further towards 
redistributing property tax revenues among school districts (Fischel, 1989). Specifically, the 
findings were that, among other requirements, "the state plus local spending, excluding a few 
categories ... should vary by no more than $100 per pupil across districts" (Fischel, 1989, p. 465). 
Furthermore, the 1979 case colloquially referred to as Serrano III codified the $100 per pupil 
requirement of Serrano II as the sole standard, indexed for inflation (Fischel, 1989). 
As these court decisions were being handed down and implemented in the state, taxpayer 
resentment towards this forced distribution and equalization of property tax revenue was growing. 
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This resentment was part of the nucleus of the then-nascent taxpayer revolt movement. After 
Serrano II, Proposition 13 was placed on a ballot and passed into law. Despite the revenue and 
expenditure caps inherent in Proposition 13, California was able to continue the progress made 
under the Serrano cases due to its massive surplus built up over previous years (Fischel, 1989). 
Change, therefore, was not immediate. 
According to Fischel, several studies, including a study by Oakland ( 1979) and Brennan 
& Buchanan ( 1979) suggest that voters felt disenfranchised from taxing and spending decisions 
in the years preceding Proposition 13 ( 1989). This sense of disenfranchisement was reinforced 
by the Serrano findings. As such, this large, unchecked government was "discipline[ d]" (Fischel, 
1989, p. 466) by the voters in the form of Proposition 13 (Fischel, 1989). These studies suggest 
that Proposition 13 served as a way for the voters to reassert themselves among politicians who 
were engaged in overspending. 
Fischel (1989) believes that Serrano actually led to Proposition 13. This is because the 
first Serrano case, voters in well-to-do districts still had quality schools, while higher taxation 
allowed for more funding for schools in less well-to-do districts (Fischel, 1989). However, after 
Serrano II, the $100 per pupil equalization factor led voters in more well-to-districts to feel more 
disenfranchised, and left out of a decision to redirect their tax dollars to areas that they felt did 
not affect them directly ( 1989). Through this progression, Fischel believes, that voters revolted 
and, " ... Serrano caused Prop[osition] 13," (Fischel, 1989, p. 467). 
Even prior to Fischel, some scholars were beginning to take a look at the effects of these 
types of limits on governmental authority. Wildavsky (1980), for instance, posits that the TEL 
movement, beginning with the taxpayer revolt of the late 1970s was inevitable. In his words, 
"Over the years public spending has been growing much faster than the economy," (pg. 5). 
,.... 
\ 
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What Wildavsky is saying is that the public sector, which was once small, in much the same way 
that the United States started out small, has grown exponentially. It has also outpaced the growth 
of the nation. Regardless of the downstream effects, some type of limits must be set in order to 
slow the gap between public sector growth and the ability of the nation and its states to keep up. 
In whatever form they eventually took, TELs were, in Wildavsky's estimation, inevitable. 
Another early study of TELs, by Bennett and Dilorenzo ( 1982), cited the Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, who conducted a detailed study of the effects of 
TEL-type restrictions that were put into place before 1976. The result of their study was that 
these types of restrictions were overall successful in reducing expenditure growth (1982). They 
also predicted that per capita state and local spending would be lower in the years coming after 
the completion of their study (1982). What Advisory Commission did not spend as much 
resources looking into; however, is that what the effects of reducing expenditures might be. 
Simply reducing expenditures does not necessarily constitute a strategic plan for long-term 
benefits to states. 
The study of the size and growth of government is not as new as the study of TELs. In 
fact, this type of analysis has been studied in public policy for many years. The TEL movement 
is just one of the newest ways in which citizens and even governments themselves can seek to 
place restrictions of the size of government. Marlow and Joulfaian (1989) conducted a study on 
how governments actually increase themselves in size by engaging in off-budget activity in the 
course of responding to unexpected stimuli throughout their budget years including response to 
natural disasters and other unexpected phenomena (1989). In this way, the authors posit that as 
early as 1989, governments were able to circumvent the effects of TELs ( 1989). One of their 
conclusions was that the real size of governmental units is actually quite hard to calculate, 
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anticipate or budget for. Similarly, TELs can provide protection against the government's ability 
to respond to unforeseen events. As such, TELs might reduce the size of government, but they 
also can serve to reduce the scope of governments. In the face of unexpected events, 
governments must either be allowed to temporarily suspend some of the limitations imposed on 
them in order to act appropriately, or they must face the consequences of inaction. 
Mullins and Joyce ( 1996) found that TELs, " ... have little effect on the overall size of the 
state and local public sector," (pg. 84). They also have found that TELs have led to state 
governments having to shoulder a larger burden for spending for most types of expenditures 
except for welfare ( 1996). This is of note, because other studies have found that TELs are 
indeed successful in limiting growth and expansion of governmental units through the raising of 
revenues or through expenditures. However, what Mullins and Joyce do say that conforms with 
much of the other literature on TELs is that while TELs do not necessarily increase the size of 
states and local public sectors, they do increase the burden on these governmental levels. As the 
ability to tax and spend are limited, states still are responsible for meeting the needs of their 
constituents, which leads to a serious dilemma. In their words, "The net effect [of TELs] is a 
rather substantial increase in relative state revenue responsibility," (Mullins & Joyce, 1996, pg. 
89). 
James and Wallis (2004) examine the effects that TABOR has had on Colorado in the 
decade after its adoption as an amendment to the Colorado state constitution. They refer 
specifically to the second half of the 2003-2004 Colorado legislative session in which the so-
called "fiscal vise," (2004, p. 16) and ways to alleviate its effects were discussed. According to 
the authors, this so-called fiscal vice, "severely limit[ed] [Colorado's] capacity to adjust to 
recessionary cycles (2004, p. 16). 
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James & Wallis also point out that TABOR brings with it a so-called, "ratcheting effect," 
(2004, p. 30). This ratcheting effect is resultant from a growth formula whereby the revenues 
that are allowable under TABOR are calculated using spending figures from the previous year 
(James & Wallis, 2004). What this means is that Colorado is always locked-in to the results of 
the previous years, and is not as able to, "bounce back," (James & Wallis, 2004, p. 30) from 
unforeseeable one-time economic downturns or other emergencies. This is a major drawback of 
TABOR: no matter how well the legislation may be in returning surplus revenues and managing 
expenditures, it does not have sufficient contingency planning built-in to respond to emergencies 
or downturns in the economy. 
On this note, Archibald and Feldman (2004) argue that there are indeed unforeseen 
downstream effects of placing limits such as these on the ability of governments to levy taxes 
and to incur expenditures. In their working paper, they study the effects of TELs on our nation's 
public educational infrastructure. They find that such types of limitations, " ... play an important 
role in explaining the difficulties that have plagued many state higher education systems ... " 
(Archibald & Feldman, 2004, pg. 30). This makes logical sense: if governments are limited in 
generating revenue and/or making expenditures, then there will be fewer funds available to run 
government programs, such as public education. As such, diminishing quality of this public 
good should be expected. 
Mullins (2004) asserts that the underlying reason for taxpayers to be interested in 
enacting TELs in their state is to reduce the overall cost of their services rather than to reduce 
their level of services (2004). Unfortunately, services usually end up being reduced because 
there are less tax dollars available to pay for them. This seems to be at the heart of issues with 
the inefficiency of the TEL-based movement. Mullins identifies four less-than-optimal potential 
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outcomes ofTELs: 1) reduced efficiencies, 2) increased costs for service delivery, 3) reduced 
ability to coordinate services, and 4.) greater compliance costs (Mullins, 2004, p. 118). 
One major issue with TELs, according to Mullins' article, is that, "Lower wealth districts 
relying on higher tax rates to produce desired levels of services may be prohibited from doing so, 
while higher wealth districts experience little such constraint" (Mullins, 2004, p. 144). While 
this may be central to conservative political dogma, does not always lead to effective governing. 
Limiting spending variation can be important to states (Mullins, 2004 ), and TELs can hinder that 
effort. The ability to respond to change, to limit variation across regions, to adequately serve all 
constituents, and to govern effectively should be central to any state government's mission. 
However, TELs can work to reduce a state's ability to do perform those functions. 
An article by Hill, Sattler, Duritsky, O'Brien and Robey (2006) studies the effects on 
TELs on Ohio. In their analysis, the authors point out that there is a built-in flaw in enacting a 
TEL in order to curtail spending and taxation, namely, that, "A sign of a well thought out piece 
of legislation is one that analysts can estimate what the impacts of the law may be," (Hill, et. al., 
2007, p. 64). According to the authors, certain TELs, such as the TEL in place in Ohio are 
written in such a vague way that there is no good way to predict what the downstream effects of 
enacting it might be. Additionally, because TELs as we know them are such a recent phenomena, 
that there does not exist a broad-base of historical data to lead contemporary analysts to be able 
to make predictable conclusions on whether short-terms savings will translate into long-term 
ones. 
Brome and Saas (2006) attempt to create three overarching arguments for why 
proponents of TELs believe they will be successful. They believe that 1.) Proponents of TELs 
support the arguments that TELs stop governments from becoming larger than the public wants 
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or needs, 2.) lower tax burdens resultant from TELs will encourage new businesses to move to 
the area, and 3.) TELs promote fiscal discipline (2006). The authors agree that the arguments for 
TELs are sound, but agree that more study is needed as there are many details that can strongly 
influence whether any of these three major arguments for TELs can be turned into success stories 
through implementation. 
Some of these details include choosing the growth index, defining an appropriate base, 
and including provisions for overriding (2006). The growth index chosen are typically personal 
income growth or population growth plus in inflation (2006). Care must be taken when choosing 
a growth index. Even if care is chosen, however, changes to the region could negatively effect 
the usefulness of the index used. Similarly, selection of the base is important. The authors 
define base as, " ... what part of the budget it covers; the level of government managing that 
budget; and whether the base year is fixed or changes from year to year," (2006, p. 6). Finally, 
provisions for overriding are helpful to include in case the government is forced to confront 
some unseen emergency, for which a response requiring additional expenditure may be of vital 
importance. 
Yuan, in his 2007 study found that the presence ofTELs in a state have," ... constrained 
local spending on public schools, as measured by a variety of indicators such as student-teacher 
ratios, teacher salaries, and teacher quality," (2007, p. 33). He goes on to further state that 
through his research, he has determined that the presence of TELs in states has had a negative 
effect on educational outcomes, effectively lowering the standards of education in these 
communities (Yuan, 2007). In other words, TELs can act as a double-edged sword: they can be 
effective in curtailing expenses. However, not all reductions of expenses can be viewed in 
isolation. What will be the lasting effects of reduced quality education? Will these lead to other 
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downstream drains on revenue, such as mass exodus from the region as voters "vote with their 
feet" and leave for better-rated school districts? This is one of the limitations of TELs: there is 
not a wealth of historical analysis in place to measure the long-term downstream effects of such 
legislation. 
Mitchell, Hughes and Campbell (2013) completed a study that looked at whether or not 
majority political parties in given states had an effect on overall budget size, budget scope, and 
reduction/increase in state expenditures. The authors employed SF A (Statistics Frontier Analysis) 
to analyze the relationship between majority political power in a state and a state's ability to 
reduce expenditures (Mitchell, et. al., 2013). What they found is that, first, majority political 
power does have an effect on budget, and second, that majority-Republican controlled 
governments actually led to an increase in expenditures (Mitchell, et. al., 2013). Since a major 
tenet of conservative politics is that smaller government is more efficient, this is a surprising 
finding. TELs are more traditionally associated with conservative government, as a way to 
check over-taxation and reduce in state expenditures, but conservative governments, according to 
this study, can often lead to increases in expenditures. 
The authors used data from U.S. states for the period of 1977 - 2001 (Mitchell, et. al., 
2013). Using this data, they made many differing findings. They found that," ... typically, the 
most important players in a state's budgetary process are the governor and [the] lower chamber, 
which makes up the governor's budget" (Mitchell, et. al., 2013, p. 13). The authors point out 
that when the governor and lower house are members of the same party, there is more fiscal 
oversight from the voters, and consequently, there may be more drive towards, " ... fiscal 
discipline," (Mitchell, et. al., 2013, p. 13). However, they find that expenditure maximization 
suffers when states are "single-party," (Mitchell, et. al., 2013, p. 15), and there is less chance of 
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the different branches of government to become involved in a "blame game," (Mitchell, et. al., 
2013, p.15). They also posit that single party rule states are better able to focus on long-term 
goals because they are not as concerned with maintaining seats or control over the governor's 
office (Mitchell, 2013). Because these types of states are able to focus more on long-term goals 
while they gain more power, they are less likely to be able to maximize budgets, (Mitchell, 2013). 
One of their more interesting findings was that, " ... a GOP majority in the House and/or the 
Senate ... is more effective at increasing state expenditures than Democrats," (Mitchell, et. al., 
2013, p.14). This is one of the few scholarly works about TELs that attempts to look at the 
movement through a political prism, which is of note, because TELs can often be highly 
identified with partisan politics in the US. 
Toder, Rosenburg and Eng (2013) discuss the several types of tax expenditures that are 
currently in existence in the United States. According to the Joint Commission on Taxation 
(JCT), the authors assert that as of 2013, there are over 200 tax expenditures in the nation, which, 
" ... combine to account for more than 1 trillion in lost revenue," (2013, p. 808). Tax 
expenditures as well as tax expenditure limitations take many forms, not all of them broad-based 
initiatives that affect entire states or even the nation, but some that have an effect only on 
individual taxpayers. 
Sun (2014) takes a different approach and finds slightly different findings than Mitchell, 
et. al. Sun used an instrumental variable approach (2014) and found that states which employ 
TELs of varying degrees of severity can actually be successful in reducing property taxes, but at 
the same time result in "substantial increases," (2014), in sales taxes, income taxes and user 
charges per capita. This is an interesting finding in that it shows us that TELs can lead to 
immediately visible "savings" in terms of reduction of property taxes, but that reduction in state 
,... 
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revenue collected through property tax can manifest itself increased expenses which are them 
passed back down to the citizen, thereby defeating the purpose of TELs. This helps support the 
hypothesis that TELs can result in higher state expenses, even though they purport to do just the 
opposite. 
In his 2014 article, Sun examines the fiscal climate of local governments in the U.S. in 
the wake of the 2008 recession (2014). Sun points out those TELs became prominent in the U.S. 
largely after the tax-revolt era of the late 1970s, and that they are often introduced as an effort to 
curtail spending or to reduce taxes (2014). Sun questions whether TELs actually have any effect 
on reducing state or local revenue (2014). What sets Sun's study apart from most of the other 
scholarly writing on TELs is his focus on municipal governments. Sun uses a very large data set 
of 724 large U.S. cities with populations of over 25,000 from the years 1970 through 2006 for his 
study (2014). This data set sets Sun's study apart from most others because of its sheer size and 
magnitude. Sun's aim was to be able to look at the effects ofTELs before, during and after the 
tax-revolt era (2014). 
Sun finds that total increases of per capita sales taxes, income taxes and other user 
charges to be greater than the total decreases in per capita property taxes (2014 ). What this 
means is that local governments who are using TELs to try to cap spending and decrease taxes 
are "tum[ing] to other revenue sources to help finance public services and actually [are raising] 
much more in per capita sales taxes, income taxes and user charges," (Sun, 2014, p.110). Sun's 
study then led to an unexpected finding, that per capita property taxes can actually be reduced 
under TELs, much more than what is "offset by the increases in other types of revenues" (Sun, 
2014, p. 112). This means that TELs actually lead to larger governments, a contradictory finding 
to the stated purpose of TEL. 
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Sun's unique approach yields some surprising findings. Using the instrumental variable 
approach described above, Sun found that states which employ TELs of varying degrees of 
severity can actually be successful in reducing property taxes, but at the same time result in 
"substantial increases," (2014), in sales taxes, income taxes and user charges per capita. This is 
an interesting finding in that it shows us that TELs can lead to immediately visible "savings" in 
terms of reduction of property taxes, but that reduction in state revenue collected through 
property tax can manifest itself increased expenses which are them passed back down to the 
citizen, thereby defeating the purpose of TELs. This helps support my hypothesis that TELs can 
result in higher state expenses, even though they purport to do just the opposite. 
Staley brings a new element to the study of TELs with the concept of volatility. 
Volatility, in his words, "Measures of volatility provide a more complete picture of a state's 
economic progress because they provide an understanding of the fluctuation from equilibrium 
that state economies experience," (2015, p. 32). Stability and volatility are important concepts 
when reviewing something like TELs. TELs can either be subject to the limitations of a state 
budget's relative volatility or stability, or they can have an effect on it. State's abilities to keep 
their budgets stable are important to the state's operations and success, and therefore, TELs 
should be able to demonstrate that they are not detrimental to this stability. 
Using panel data and time-series cross-sectional analysis of 48 states over 37 years 
(1969-2005), Staley (2015, p.29), finds that" states with more stringently binding tax and 
expenditure limitations-in addition to other political, demographic, economic, and geographic 
factors-are associated with greater levels of state revenue volatility." Staley takes the study of 
TELs one-step further and introduces the concept of stringency analysis. TELs, in Staley's 
estimation can vary in level of stringency, and therefore, their effects on states economies should 
take be judged by their relative stringency. He has assigned values from low to high, as 
evidenced by the following table: 
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Table 3: Stringency of TEL initiatives 
State Year Strin2ency 
Alaska 1982 Medium 
Arizona 1978 Medium 
Arkansas 1934 Low 
California 1979 Low/medium 
Colorado 1991/1992 Medium/high 
Connecticut 199111992 Medium 
Delaware 1978 Medium 
Florida 1994 Medium/high 
Hawaii 1978 Medium 
Idaho 1980 Low 
Indiana 2002 Low 
Illinois 1992 Low 
Louisiana 1993 Low/high 
Maine 2005 Low 
Maryland 1979 Low 
Maine 1986 Low/medium 
Michigan 1978 Medium 
Mississiooi 1982 Low/medium 
Missouri 1980 Medium 
1996 High 
Montana 1981 Medium 
Nevada 1979 Medium 
New Jersey 1990 Low 
North Carolina 1991 Medium 
Okalahoma 1985 Medium 
Oregon 2000 Low/medium 
2001 
Rhode Island 1992 Low/medium 
South Carolina 1980 Medium 
South Dakota 1996 Medium 
Tennessee 1978 Medium 
Texas 1978 Medium 
Utah 1989 Medium 
Washington 1979 Medium 
1993 
Wisconsin 2001 Low 
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2.2 Conclusions drawn from the literature 
The literature on the subject of TELs is vast, but it is mostly of recent vintage. This is 
likely because TELs themselves are a relatively recent development. The oldest articles study 
the earliest statutory and constitutional TELs that were enacted in the wake of the Taxpayer 
Revolt of the late 1970s. Recent years have brought about much more analysis of the effects that 
TELs have on state economies and service levels over time. Only time will tell us the long-term 
effects of such initiatives, but much of the literature points to an assertion that TELs in fact do 
perform their stated purpose of reducing expenditures and tax levies in the short term. What the 
literature also points to, however, is that TELs can have unexpected effects such as increased 
variation (or volatility) in state operations, the reduction of state services, and in some cases, 
increased expenses in other areas as funds begin to deplete, and an inability of states to 
adequately respond to crises and emergencies. 
According to Figlio (1998), "voters believed that there was no effective trade-off between 
public and private goods." In other words, voters, emboldened by the rhetoric being traded about 
at the height of the Tax Revolt of the late 1970s, became convinced of the idea that reducing 
taxes would have a positive effect on their lives because they would be paying less of their 
paycheck back to their local or state government. What they did not realize, however, was that 
there would be a commensurate decline in the level of public services that their government 
could provide to them as a result of reduced tax revenues. Most, if not all, citizens of local 
government benefit from some type of government service, whether it be opt-out services like 
public schools, or services that are shared by all, such as police services, garbage pickup, and 
road maintenance. As such, TEL initiatives provide a double-edged sword: a smaller 
government, but a smaller government which can be handicapped as to how it provides services 
" 
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to its constituency. Still, TEL initiatives continue to appear across the states because of their 
promise to lower the tax burden on citizens. 
While TEL initiatives remain popular and continue to appear across the states, the 
incidence of the adoption of constitutional TELs, passed through popular ballot or other types of 
referenda, are slowing down. Statutory TELs, however, continue to be introduced and passed 
into law. Again, the long-term effects still require study over long periods of time, but the 
introduction of such bills into state legislatures continues unabated. 
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Chapter 3. Methods 
3.1 Research design and sources of data 
This study uses a panel of 50 states for a five-year period from 2006 to 2011. The longer 
time frame used in this study allows us to capture the effects of TELs before, during, and after 
the start of the 2008 recession. The 2011 data are the most recent data available at the time of 
analysis. Data were collected from a variety of sources. Specifically, data were collected from 
the National Conference of State Legislatures across all fifty states regarding TELs on the state 
level and partisan makeup of state government (state governor, state house of representatives and 
state legislature) year by year for the calendar years 2006 through 2011. The data on the party 
makeup of the governor's office, house and senate of each of the fifty United States for the years 
2006 through 2011 were collected from Multistate Associates Incorporated and Polidata 
Demographic and Political Guides. The financial data were collected from the Census Bureau's 
Annual Survey of State Government Finances and Census of Government, and data on TELs 
were based on the Mullins and Wallin' s (2004) article. Data were also collected regarding 
whether or not any tax expenditure limitations were in effect in those states during that same 
time period. Further, data were collected about total revenues and expenses by type incurred by 
those states during that same time period. 
Table 4 presents a summary of variables and sources of data. 
Table 4: Variables and Sources of Data 
N Variable 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Source 
National Conference of State 
Le islatures 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
United States Census Bureau 
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Based on literature review and historical records on TEL, a set of hypotheses were 
formulated and tested. The hypotheses consider the impact of the presence of TELs in states on 
different types of state outlays. 
Hypothesis I: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state general 
expenditures. 
Hypothesis 2: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending/or police. 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending/or 
corrections. 
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Hypothesis 4: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending/or 
education. 
Hypothesis 5: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending/or 
highways. 
Hypothesis 6: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending/or parks. 
Hypothesis 7: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending for natural 
resources. 
Hypothesis 8: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending/or 
hospitals. 
Hypothesis 9: The presence of TEL in a state has a negative impact on state spending/or 
healthcare. 
Hypothesis 10: The presence of TEL in a state increases the state outlays on debt interest 
payments. 
Hypothesis 11: The presence of TEL in a state increases the state outlays on total debt. 
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3.3 Measures and variables 
Populations were used to control for state size, and all independent and control variables 
are per capita variables. 
The vector of independent variables contains two types of variables: the control variables 
and the hypothesis variables. 
1) Independent variable: Tax Expenditure Limitations 
2) Control variables 
Our benchmark specification included one control variable: the state's total revenues per capita 
to control for the state's fiscal solvency. This variable is expected to be positively associated 
with different types of states expenditures. 
3) Dependent variables: 
There are two groups of dependent variables. 
Expenditures: 
1. Spending on police per capita 
2. Spending on corrections per capita 
3. Spending on education per capita 
4. Spending on highways per capita 
5. Spending on parks per capita 
6. Spending on natural resources per capita 
7. Spending on hospitals per capita 
8. Spending on healthcare per capita 
9. Spending on parks per capita 
10. Spending on administration per capita 
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Debt: 
I. Debt interest payments per capita 
2. Total debt per capita in the end of year 
T bl 5 D a e : . f s escnp 1ve tahshcs o f V anab es 
Variable Obs Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
State's total revenues 
totalrevpc 300 6.4043 2.540 106 1.5 1 23 .71 
per capita 
General expense 
genexppc 300 5.374833 1.58334 3.3 14.17 
spending per capita 
Spending on education 
educ pc per capita 300 1.915767 0.464785 1.1 4 3.71 
Spending on hospitals 
hospitalspc per capita 300 0.1 753 0.13372 1 0 0.5 
Spending on healthcare 
health pc per capita 300 0.1951 0.10626 1 0.04 0.54 
Spending on highways 
highwyspc per capita 300 0.4345 0.254393 0.17 2.03 
Spending on police per 
policepc 
capita 300 0.050433 0.027042 0.0 1 0.16 
Spending on corrections 
corrpc per capita 300 0.156 0.053324 0.08 0.39 
Spending on natural 
natrespc 
resources per capita 300 0.1034 0. 104384 0.02 0.75 
Spending on parks per 
parks pc 
capita 300 0.024267 0.015895 0 0.08 
Spending on 
govadmpc 
administration per 300 0.209433 0.127455 0.06 0.86 
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capita 
General debt interest 
genera Id int 300 873 194.6 1096243 44342 7302 166 
End of fiscal year debt 
endfydebtpc per capita 300 3.635033 2.1 47466 0.63 
Tax expenditure 
tel limitation 300 0.623333 0.48536 0 
Debt interest payments 
debtintpc per capita 300 0. 166467 0.105591 0.03 
General expense per 
genexppc 300 5.374833 1.58334 3.3 
capita 
3.4 Research model 
The impact of TELs on mun icipal revenue were estimated through a set of regressions 
expressed in the fo llowing equation: 
Expi1 = u1TELi1 + a Xi1 +pFi1 + Ui + 81 + Ei1 
where Expi1 is different type of state expenditure or expenditure from different sources for state i 
in year t in different model specifications, TEL it is a dummy variable for state i in year t ( I =state 
i in year t subject to TELs; 0 = state i in year t not subject to T ELs), X is a vector of contro l 
variable (total state revenue per capita), F is a vector of our hypothesis variables (mainly the 
different types of outlays per capita and the debt and interest payments per capita) , u is a state 
fi xed effect (for a fi xed-effects model), 8 is a time fi xed effect, Eit is the error term, and i and I are, 
respecti vely, the state and time subscripts. We consider the Xii an important variable that should 
be positively correlated with state expenditure. 
Time series data traditionally brings about issues related to autocorre lation. It is 
reasonable to expect contemporaneous correlation of variables across all fi fty states, however, if 
12. 13 
I 
0.57 
14. 17 
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serial correlation is present in an idiosyncratic error, then a first-differenced model is more 
efficient than a fixed effects model. Econometrically, a choice needed to be made between 
running a fixed effect or random effect model. The Hausman test was chosen and determined 
that the random effect model was the proper specification as it had better p-values. The random 
effect model also enabled us to avoid the problem of time-invariant region characteristics (fixed 
effects), such as geography and demographics that may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The Hausman test for random effects versus fixed effects was used to choose between 
the more efficient random effect model (RE) and the more consistent fixed effect model (FE). 
Both the RE and the FE models assume strict exogeneity. If the state-specific error is correlated 
with the covariates, FE models can address this by transforming the model to remove the state-
specific error. The FE model subtracts the within-state average from each observation on that 
state to remove the unit-specific effect. FE models cannot remove time-varying unobserved 
effects, and FE removes all time-constant effects from the model, such as the duration of capital 
budgeting if it didn't change in some states. The FE model also trades consistency for 
efficiency. RE models, on the other hand, assume that the unobserved effects do not bias the 
estimates. RE models add the stringent assumption that the state-specific error is equal to zero. 
The null hypothesis for the Hausman test assumes that the differences in the coefficients between 
the RE and the FE models are not systematic or that the state-specific error is uncorrelated with 
the covariates. The results from the Hausman test suggest that the null hypothesis was 
accepted. The fixed effects model was rejected in favor of the random effects model because it 
is more efficient model (Prob>chi2 = 0.993). 
A second econometric problem concerns the autocorrelations of the disturbances that can 
involve biased coefficients affecting the interpretation of our results. This problem was solved by 
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applying the standard Durbin-Watson d statistic to test for autocorrelated errors. Woolridge' s 
first differenced test was used to test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error. For this test, 
the current period residuals were regressed on the previous period residuals. If the idiosyncratic 
errors are homoscedastic, the first-differenced errors will have a correlation coefficient of -0.5. 
When the current period residuals were regressed on the previous period residuals, the first-
differenced errors had a correlation effect of 0.007. This was significantly different from -0.5 at 
the 0.001 level. This test indicates that either a fixed effect (FE GLS) or random effect (RE) 
GLS regression should be employed. 
Table 6: Results 
Hypotheses Coefficient Supported/not supported 
Hypothesis I: The presence ofTELs in state has a -0.123t Marginally supported 
nef!ative impact on state J!eneral exvenditures. 
Hypothesis 2: The presence ofTELs in state has a -0.007* Marginally supported 
nef!ative impact on state spendinf! on po/ice. 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of TELs in state has a 0.017*** Supported 
nef!ative impact on state spendinI! for corrections. 
Hypothesis 4: The presence of TELs in state has a 0.01 ** Supported 
nef!ative impact on state spendinf! on education. 
Hypothesis 5: The presence of TELs in state has a 0.05** Supported 
nef!ative impact on state spendinf! on hif!hways 
Hypothesis 6: The presence of TELs in state has a 0.004* Marginally supported 
nef!ative impact on state spendinI! on parks. 
Hypothesis 7: The presence of TELs in state has a 0.023*** Supported 
negative impact on state spending on natural 
resources. 
Hypothesis 8: The presence of TELs in state has a 0.011 ** Not supported 
ne2ative impact on state spendinI! on hospitals. 
Hypothesis 9: The presence of TELs in state has a 0.007** Not supported 
neI!ative impact on state spendinI! on healthcare. 
Hypothesis JO: The presence of TELs in state 0.032*** Supported 
increases state spendinf! on debt interest oavments 
Hypothesis JI: The presence of TELs in state 0.637t Marginally supported 
increases state spendinf! on total debt. 
t ifp < 0.10, * ifp < 0.05; ** ifp < 0.01; *** ifp < 0.001. 
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3.5 Notes on state spending trends 
According to a report covering state spending over the years 2010-2012, prepared by the 
National Association of State Budget Officers, "State expenditures have seen tremendous shifts 
over the past several years due to the ramifications of the recent national recession," (NASBO, 
2012, p. 1 ). Of note, during this period, expenses for elementary and secondary education first 
increased slightly in 2011, then began dropping off by 1.9% in 2012 (NASBO, 2012). During 
this same period, higher education expenses followed a similar path, first increasing by 3.8% in 
2011, then taking a decline of 4.1 % in 2012. Corrections expenditures, which increased by 
1.1% in 2011, continued increasing by 2.5% in 2012 (NASBO, 2012). 
3.5 Practice model guiding the study 
For this study, the random effect model was used for 50 states during the time period of 
2006 through 2011. Using panel data analysis, this study analyzed how stringently binding tax 
and expenditure limitations-in addition to other financial and political factors-affected lower 
levels of state expenditures for police, parks, natural resources and highway expenditures. 
This model enabled us to avoid the problem of time-invariant region characteristics (fixed 
effects), such as geography and demographics that may be correlated with the explanatory 
variables. The Hausman test for random effects versus fixed effects was used to choose between 
the more efficient random effect model (RE) and the more consistent fixed effect model (FE). 
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Chapter 4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive data 
Variables were tested by random effect (RE) GLS regression using Stata 13 software. 
Any P>z result less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant for the purposes of this test. 
Several expense variables were analyzed using the formula xtreg [variable] tel totalreven, where 
"tel" referred to whether or not a state had enacted any tax expenditure limitations, and 
"totalreven" referred to the total revenue of the relevant states during this time period. Variables 
tested were: police, education, government administration, parks, natural resources, highways, 
corrections and hospitals. 
Police expenditures were determined to be statistically significant with a P>z result of 
0.049. Education was not significant at 0.393. Government administration was also not 
significant with results at 0.556. Parks were determined to be statistically significant at 0.047. 
Similarly, natural resources were significant at 0.0 I 0. Highways were also statistically 
significant at 0.017. Hospitals, finally, were not with a P>z value of 0.533. 
It can be determined that states that have enacted TELs have had significant difficulty 
dealing with police, parks, natural resource, and highway expenses. TELs were not helpful for 
states in terms of keeping expenses down relative to total revenues in these important state 
expenditure categories. 
Parks expenditures, natural resource expenditures, and highway expenditures were also 
considered statistically significant, and the results showed that despite (or perhaps as a result of) 
the presence of TELs, expenses in these categories actually increased related to total revenue 
during the period of time studied (2006 - 2011 ). 
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4.2 Inferential data 
According to Lav, et. al. (20 I 0), "it is worth noting that the problems states ... are facing 
are overwhelmingly a result of declining revenue and not ... of excessive spending or 
mismanagement. .. " (20 I 0, pg. 6). They go on to point out that between 200 I and 20 I 0, state 
spending did not increase significantly, and actually fell relative to spending in 2001, falling 
more precipitously during 2010 (Lav, et. al., 2010). 
Why this is important to note is that some programs in states can actually receive federal 
help, including healthcare such as Medicare, and education through education block grants and 
ARRA funding that came through in 2010. Perhaps police, parks, natural resources and highway 
expenditures do not get the same type of federal relief as some other categories? If this is so, it 
might explain why these categories actually led to an increase in expenditures on the state level 
during times of tax expenditure limitations. 
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Chapter 5. Discussion 
5.1 Discussion related to the findings of the study 
The idea of a TEL initiative as public referendum is a relatively new concept in the 
history of our nation. Even though the United States was founded on principles of proper 
representation before taxation, as our country grew, the need for more revenue was sated by the 
increasing ability of the state to levy more taxes. As this has happened, the line of appropriate 
taxation has been severely blurred. There are the numerous administrative levels of government 
(state, county, municipal) that have this authority, and the opportunities for ambiguity escalate 
exponentially. Because of this, it was only a matter of time before taxpayer frustration evolved 
into political action in the form of legislation and constitutional amendments to cap the 
government's ability to levy taxes without recourse. 
The first TABOR initiative took place in Colorado in 1992 with an amendment to the 
state's constitution placing a cap on spending and taxation. Some of the unintended side effects 
of this amendment were limited ability of the government to respond to one-time fiscal crises 
and emergencies, and a reduction of the state's many government-provided social programs. 
While a reduction in the size of government may have been one of the goals of this endeavor, 
there are some programs such as healthcare and education that regardless of partisan leaning, the 
public does not wish to see done away with. 
Many TEL initiatives have been proposed throughout the country since the Colorado 
amendment in 1992. However, many of them sit permanently tabled as lawmakers try to craft 
ways for avoiding the negative impacts associated with Colorado's TABOR. And, again, TELs 
are a highly partisan issue, divided along party lines with many conservative voices touting its 
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virtues, and the more liberal among its loudest dissenters. Due to this dichotomy, TEL initiatives 
seem to have a hard time passing into law to the degree that they are proposed. 
During great recession budget crises have gripped the nation. Many states, localities and 
municipalities are struggling to stay afloat. One of the primary means they have to stay in the 
black-other than borrowing-is the ability to levy taxes. The problem is that capping the 
taxation authority of any level of government certainly limits what they can tax, but in doing so, 
it limits their overall power. Additionally, this kind of measure leads to decreasing service to the 
constituents, because as time goes on, the costs of services only increase. With a government 
less able to spend dollars providing services, the quality, quantity or both of the services 
decreases. The long-term effects of TEL initiatives must be carefully measured, then the 
findings applied on a case-by-case basis to any such proposed initiatives. 
This researcher believes that the literature review and analysis has revealed that TEL 
initiatives do limit the size of governmental units. They also, however, limit the authority of 
government, and in doing so, limit the ability of government to respond quickly and effectively 
to unforeseen crises. Aberrations, such as one-year recessions, and unexpected emergency 
situations create an unrealistic standard by which to measure future increases, and therefore 
make it nearly impossible to recover from them. Additionally, according to the testing 
performed here, they do not ensure that the amount of expenditures will not increase as the 
power of the government decreases. In fact, this researcher has found that some expenditures 
can go up in relation to total revenue when TEL initiatives are in place. 
TEL seems to be modeled on a flawed formula, which many other states have picked up 
on, explaining why no such measures have been enacted in any other state. Colorado itself 
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placed a moratorium on their own TEL, the TABOR amendment, in 2005 after witnessing a 
severe decline in funding for programs and a standing of the state nationally. 
5.2 Strengths and limitations 
One major limitation of this study is the period of time that has been taken into 
consideration. The years 2006 through 2010 were, at the time of writing, the most recent block 
of five consecutive years for which detailed information on state expenditures was easily 
available. Additionally, for more recent years, pending legislation has not yet been passed, either 
constitutionally or statutorily. Previous years, going back to the beginning of the Taxpayer 
Revolt, which would have included the mid- l 970s, would have been a welcome addition to the 
study as well, but detailed records of state expenditures by expenditure type were not easily 
available. 
Other studies used greater time periods, such as Mitchell, et. al. (2013) which used a time 
period that spanned 1977 - 2001. This data set allowed the authors to begin looking at the 
effects of TELs from the very beginning of the movement. Using this much larger data set, the 
authors were able to examine many more findings including political ramifications of TELs. 
Sun's 2014 study analyzed data from 724 large U.S. cities from 1970-2006. Sun's study not 
only utilized a longer time period, but focused directly on a large amount of major cities across 
the nation. The time period also covered years before the Taxpayer Revolt began to take hold. 
Sun was able to come to the conclusions that some TELs actually lead to larger governments, a 
finding that contradicts much of TEL ideology. This more expansive data set may have helped 
the author reach a more robust and varied set of conclusions, given the breadth of the data. 
One strength of its study is its relatively expansive data set that encompassed expenditure 
types across all 50 states. Many studies, such as James and Wallis (2004) focus only on one 
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major initiative, such as Colorado's TABOR. This study has a much wider data set and can 
provide more context by looking across the states. This study examined the scope of the TEL 
movement across the nation over a five year period, and emphasized how prevalent the 
movement has become in recent years. 
5.3 Future directions 
In the twenty plus years since the implementation of the original TABOR amendment in 
Colorado, much has been learned from their mistakes. However, the popularity of proposing 
TELs around the nation has not declined. It has, though, been much more difficult for other 
governmental units to pass because of the highly partisan nature of its support and because of the 
many highly-visible instances of problems resulting from TABOR. Recently, such proposals 
have begun to address the many ill effects of TABOR in hopes of enacting it in new locales 
while mitigating its possible negative effects. Despite the drop off in broad appeal, the tenets 
behind this type of initiative remain popular with many in the U.S. Future circumstances may 
bring about resurgence in popular appeal for this type of legislation. 
Future research into this field would include further analysis of municipal governments 
and municipal TELs. Other than Sun's study, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to 
TEL legislation in cities as opposed to state governments. Sun's large data set which was able to 
show changes over an over 35-year period is also a desirable way to look at larger blocks of data 
and analyze and interpret broader trends. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusions 
According to Maher and Deller (2010), "The fiscal pressure facing local governments 
today is more severe than has been experienced at any time in the past 50 years," (p. 3). While 
this statement was made over 5 years prior to the writing of this paper, it holds true that fiscal 
pressure on local governments continue to rise. As such, tough choices must be made in order 
for state governments to be able to adequately provide services for their constituents. States like 
Illinois, face dire budget crises, compounded by high public pension obligations that are forcing 
the state to take drastic action. 
This fiscal pressure, however, has been occurring since the Taxpayer Revolt of the mid-
1970s. Maher and Deller (2010) refer to the " ... near fiscal meltdown," (pg. 4) of major cities 
across the U.S. during this time period. Because of this increasing fiscal pressure, the incidents 
ofTELs have increased in the same time period (Maher and Deller, 2010). 
Even after the initial, high-profile success of TABOR in Colorado, which have since been 
tempered by suspensions and re-evaluating, TELs continue to be a popular solution to the 
problem of high taxes. There are many TEL laws, statutory and constitutional, on the books 
across the US, with varying levels of stringency, that guide public policy on the state and local 
level. Some of these TELs have been in existence for nearly forty years, others only a few, so 
there has been no multi-generational study of the effects over long periods of time. Those types 
of studies are only now appearing as we reach the first half-century of organized TEL initiatives. 
One thing is clear: as with any such ordinances, there is almost always a trade-off of 
some type. The most striking argument against TELs is that for every reduction in taxes, there 
canl also be a commensurate reduction in the quality or quantity of public services provided to 
constituents. There will certainly be governments that are able to use their existing tax bases and 
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build up sufficient war chests to be able to respond quickly and efficiently to emergent situations, 
but, any type of TEL legislation will have some effect on the ability of a government to quickly 
respond or raise funds. 
TELs can have an impact, as they are designed to, on the size of government. They can 
limit governmental scope and authority. This can be either a good or bad thing depending on 
who is deciding and what their goals and needs are. One of the results of this study is that TELs 
can also have a negative effect on public service delivery, and certain combinations ofTELs can 
actually lead to increases of expenses in unexpected areas. There is no perfect formula for 
permanently capping expenses and taxation authority in something as ever-changing and ever-
adapting as a democratically-elected government serving a diverse group of Americans. 
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Chapter 7. Implications of the study 
TELs show no sign of disappearing from US legislatures or voter ballots. As such, 
comprehensive study and analysis is needed in order to determine whether or not TELs are 
capable of doing what they purport to do (i.e. reducing the size and authority of government), 
and whether or not their effects are beneficial or detrimental to citizens. It is clear from this 
study, that TELs can have effects on government spending, as well as on service delivery to 
citizens. Since citizens depend on their governments for a variety of services, this relationship is 
important. Additionally, since there have been numerous fiscal crises across the nation before, 
during and since the economic downturn which began in 2008, the implications of state and local 
government spending and taxation are commensurately magnified. 
TELs are a citizen-led attempt to reduce the power of government. This represents a shift 
in traditional ways of interacting with governments with regards to public service delivery. If 
such initiatives are to work, long-term study of their possible effects must be carried out. This 
study hopefully will add to the ever-growing body of literature which is developing around this 
relatively new phenomenon and perhaps further discussion on what TELs can do, how they can 
be used effectively, and to what kinds of change they may lead. 
Hopefully, this study will lead to further analysis of the TEL movement and allow those 
legislatures currently considering enacting a TEL, or those with a TEL on the books to examine 
the potential downstream effects of such cuts, limits or caps. Reducing or limiting one type of 
expense may unexpectedly lead to an increase of another and relationships that were not readily 
apparent may make themselves known in less than ideal ways. Great care must be taken when 
placing limits on government. 
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